Any resemblance to actual events or persons is purely coincidental - names have been changed. The stakes, however, are very real.
In This Issue
After a €359 Million LBO, the Founder Wants to Get Control Back.
A concrete example of abuse of rights in shareholders’ agreements
Could that dispute have been avoided?
What this means for your deals
1. After a €359 Million LBO, the Founder Wants to Get Control Back.
The Deal: In 2015, Vantermoor Capital, a leading PE fund, acquires a 52% majority stake in a medical device company for €359 million. Marc, the founder-CEO, keeps 44.8% through his family holding company. A shareholders’ agreement is signed to govern classical items such as board composition, CEO removal, and - critically - the fund’s right to exit via a sale or IPO.
Three years later, the relationship starts breaking down.
Marc’s Removal. Marc indicates that he wants his company back. He and a new partner try to negotiate with Vantermoore Capital but the negotiation fail.
In December 2018, Marc is removed. He no longer is the CEO of the commpany. He challenges his removal in court but loses twice.
The Catch. Two years later, he exercises a call option under the shareholders’ agreement, demanding that Vantermoore Capital sells its stake back to him for €263 million. This is €96 million below the price which the fund paid. The conditions for exercising the option had not been met. Vantermoore Capital refuses. Marc sues Vantermoore Capital to enforce the call option. He loses again, and is ordered to pay damages for abusive proceedings.
The Fund’s Response. Vantermoore Capital then goes on the offensive and seeks to terminate the shareholders’ agreement entirely before the Paris Commercial Court. The latter agrees: Marc deliberately exercised a right whose conditions were not met, with the clear purpose of forcing a below-value sale or blocking the fund’s exit altogether. That constitutes an abuse of rights serious enough to destroy the contractual relationship.
The Result. The agreement is terminated. At the time of the judgment, the fund had received no return on a stake held for nearly a decade. A planned IPO had been approved but could not proceed while the litigation was ongoing. The fund is finally free to exit - but only after six years of blocked liquidity.
What this cost - in numbers.
Six years of blocked exit on a €359 million stake is far more important than just a legal problem. because it severely affects a fund’s lifecycle. The problem is clear: capital that cannot be returned cannot be redeployed. LP commitments have timelines.
And a forced exit at the wrong moment, under deadline pressure, is rarely a good exit.
For PE fund managers: Your right to force an exit is only as strong as the obligation which you can enforce against the co-shareholder. A loosely worded clause does not give you a readily enforceable right as this case demonstrates. If it leaves room for interpretation, you will often need a judge or an arbitrator to provide that interpretation and this opens the door to several years of obstruction in certain cases.
For family offices making direct investments alongside a PE fund: you are bound by the same shareholders’ agreement. When the fund’s exit is blocked, so is yours.
2. A Concrete Example of Abuse of Rights in Shareholders’ Agreements
A. Abuse of Rights: A Double-Edged Sword
The court reaffirmed a principle that is often overlooked in transactional practice: deliberately exercising a contractual right when you know the conditions for its exercise are not met is an abuse of rights. In this case, the abuse was Marc’s attempt to enforce the call option with the clear purpose of forcing a below-value sale or blocking the fund’s exit altogether. This led to the termination of the shareholders agreement, which courts rarely order.
B. Liquidity as a Fundamental Condition of the Fund’s Consent
The court grounded its decision in a straightforward observation: for a PE fund, the ability to exit is the very reason the investment was made. The shareholders’ agreement expressly required the founder to cooperate towards a sale and an IPO. He did the opposite. That breach, sustained over years, was serious enough to justify terminating the agreement entirely.
C. Termination of the Agreement: Proportionate Sanction or Nuclear Option?
French courts rarely order the termination of a shareholders agreement. Here, the court did so but it did not do it lightly. It applied a proportionality test: how serious was the breach? How long did it persist? Was the other party at fault? Only after concluding that the relationship was irreparably broken did it order termination - for the future only, with no retroactive effect.
3. Could That Dispute Have Been Avoided?
Probably not entirely - but its cost could have been dramatically reduced.
The underlying conflict here did not stem from drafting problem, but rather from Marc’s strategy that relied on the judicial weponisation of a call option and crossed quite a few lines in the French commercial court’s view.
Had the parties included a well-drafted arbitration clause, several things would likely have been different:
Confidentiality. An arbitration would not have removed the dispute. But it would have kept it out of the public domain - and off the radar of potential IPO underwriters.
Speed. A standard Delos arbitration concludes in less than a year, an ICC arbitration in 18 to 24 months. Not six years.
Consolidation. Three separate sets of proceedings could have been heard by a single tribunal. One case. One award.
Urgent relief. Emergency arbitrator proceedings (available under ICC and LCIA rules) can produce a binding order within two to three weeks - potentially stopping the founder’s strategy before it caused six years of damage.
Specialist decision-makers. Arbitral tribunals can be constituted to include practitioners with direct PE and M&A transactional experience - something a commercial court rarely offers.
The real lesson: the parties did not lack remedies. They lacked the right dispute resolution mechanism applying to all of their agreements.
4. What This Means for Your Deals
During the negotiation of a shareholders agreement everyone usually leaves the dispute resolution clause at the end. It is called “the midnight clause” for that reason. However, it is the clause that will be triggered in case of a dispute.
Ask yourself: does your dispute resolution clause actually work? A boilerplate jurisdiction clause is not a dispute resolution strategy. In any cross-border PE deal, the clause should: name the arbitral institution and seat; provide for consolidation of related disputes; include a multi-step process with hard deadlines; and extend to all ancillary documents - the management package, the articles, the investment agreement. As this case shows, the dispute resolution clause determines not just how a dispute is resolved, but how long it lasts, how public it becomes, and whether the fund can exit at all.
If any of these questions apply to an agreement you are currently negotiating or managing, we are available for a confidential conversation
The Deal Catch is published monthly by Anima Dispute Resolution. It analyses disputes reshaping M&A and post-acquisition practice.
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